Discriminative Representation Combinations for Accurate Face Spoofing
  Detection by Song, Xiao et al.
Discriminative Representation Combinations for
Accurate Face Spoofing Detection
Xiao Song, Xu Zhao, Liangji Fang and Tianwei Lin
Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing MOE,
Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Abstract
Three discriminative representations for face presentation attack detection
are introduced in this paper. Firstly we design a descriptor called spatial
pyramid coding micro-texture (SPMT) feature to characterize local appear-
ance information. Secondly we utilize the SSD, which is a deep learning
framework for detection, to excavate context cues and conduct end-to-end
face presentation attack detection. Finally we design a descriptor called tem-
plate face matched binocular depth (TFBD) feature to characterize stereo
structures of real and fake faces. For accurate presentation attack detection,
we also design two kinds of representation combinations. Firstly, we propose
a decision-level cascade strategy to combine SPMT with SSD. Secondly, we
use a simple score fusion strategy to combine face structure cues (TFBD)
with local micro-texture features (SPMT). To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our design, we evaluate the representation combination of SPMT and SSD
on three public datasets, which outperforms all other state-of-the-art meth-
ods. In addition, we evaluate the representation combination of SPMT and
TFBD on our dataset and excellent performance is also achieved.
Keywords: Face presentation attack detection, template face registration,
binocular depth, spatial pyramid coding, micro-texture, SSD, decision-level
cascade strategy
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1. Introduction
In recent years, face recognition based identity authentication systems [1,
2] are popular. However, similar to other biometric modalities [3, 4], security
risks hide in the system. Many authentication systems can’t judge whether
faces are captured from authorized clients or from presentation attacks.
There are various presentation attacks, for example, prints, photographs,
videos displayed on screens and 3D models such as face masks [5]. Images
or videos of an authorized user can be easily obtained from Internet or by
portable cameras. 2D fake faces are cheap to make, but 3D masks are expen-
sive to build and are rare in real applications. Hence in this paper, we focus
on 2D presentation attacks including prints, photos and videos. As shown in
Fig. 1, telling real faces is difficult even for humans. Consequently, robust
presentation attack detection (PAD) methods are needed.
Recently, several state-of-the-art face PAD methods are proposed. Wen
et al. [6] utilize image distortion analysis for presentation attack detection.
Boulkenafet et al. [7] regard micro-texture in color space as the vital cue for
presentation attack detection. Yang et al. [8] design a person-specific model
for presentation attack detection and Patel et al. [9] defend presentation
attacks based on convolutional neural networks. More related works are
illustrated in Section 2.
Recaptured images lose some high-frequency information [10, 11, 12] be-
cause of limited resolution and gaussian blurring. Appearance is also changed
due to the abnormal shading on re-imaged surfaces. Furthermore, printing
artifacts or noise signatures in captured videos [13, 14] also exist. Conse-
quently, micro-texture is a helpful cue for discriminating the appearance of
real face and fake face.
Another helpful cue for presentation attack detection is the stereo struc-
ture of face. A fake face displayed on a screen cannot mimic the structure
of a real face [15] because the screen is always planar. In addition, a printed
fake face cannot mimic the rigid structure of a real face by any operations.
Hence recovering face stereo structure is beneficial for face liveness judgment.
Recently convolutional neural network (CNN) based methods achieve ex-
cellent performance in many computer vision tasks, such as object detection
[16]. Deep representations extracted from convolutional neural network are
with rich semantical information. Hence utilizing the deep network for face
presentation attack detection is appropriate.
In this paper, we propose two kinds of representation combinations for
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Figure 1: (a) From top to bottom, NUAA, CASIA and REPLAY-ATTACK datasets, from
left to right, real face, fake face and Fisher face. (b) We randomly select 200 real faces
and 200 video attack frames from REPLAY-ATTACK. Pixel vectors in facial regions are
hard to distinguish.
face presentation attack detection. We demonstrate that both of them achieve
excellent performance for face PAD task. The first one combines SPMT
with SSD, because local appearance descriptors and global context cues are
proven complementary. The second one combines SPMT with TFBD, in
which stereo structure cues are exploited and combined with 2D appearance
features. Based on our design, two effective solutions for face PAD task is
obtained.
The first representation combination only needs a single image. Firstly,
we design a hand-crafted descriptor called SPMT to encode local micro-
textures. We propose a spatial pyramid encoding algorithm hence SPMT is
capable of encoding multi-scale information in facial regions. Secondly, we
utilize the Single Shot MultiBox Detector (SSD) [16] for end-to-end liveness
judgment. As current PAD datasets are relatively small, we reduce the com-
plexity of prediction layers to avoid over-fitting problem. Lastly, we propose a
decision-level cascade strategy to confirm or correct obscure judgments from
SSD. Once the output is regarded uncertain, SPMT descriptor is extracted
from corresponding facial region to make further judgment.
The second representation combination needs a binocular image pair.
We design another hand-crafted descriptor called TFBD to capture stereo
structure’s difference between real face and fake face. As recovering dense 3D
structure is time-consuming, we choose to recover the sparse face structure
3
based on sparse facial landmarks using proposed template face registration
algorithm. Finally, TFBD descriptor is combined with SPMT descriptor.
The score fusion of two SVM outputs determines the classification result.
In this paper, our main contribution is three-fold.
(i) We propose the TFBD descriptor with a template face registration
algorithm, and the SPMT descriptor with a spatial pyramid encoding algo-
rithm. In addition, we are the first to utilize SSD for face PAD.
(ii) We introduce a complementary representation combination “SPMT
+ SSD” for face PAD, and a decision-level cascade strategy. “SPMT + SSD”
achieves excellent performance on three public datasets.
(iii) We also introduce another representation combination “SPMT +
TFBD” for face PAD, where 2D appearance descriptor is proven to be com-
plementary with stereo structure cues.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work on face
presentation attack detection is reviewed in Section 2. The combination of
SPMT and SSD is introduced in Section 3. The combination of TFBD and
SPMT is introduced in Section 4. Datasets, protocols, evaluation metrics
and experimental results are detailed in Section 5. Conclusion and future
work are illustrated in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Despite the multimodal methods [17, 18], most face presentation attack
detection methods can be divided into five categories: motion based ap-
proaches [19, 20, 21, 22], texture based approaches [13, 23, 7], stereo struc-
ture based approaches [24, 15], deep learning based approaches [25, 9, 26]
and other approaches [27, 6, 28, 29, 30]. Research surveys can be found in
[31, 23].
(i) Motion based methods aim at capturing biometric motions such as
eye blinking [32, 19, 33], mouth movement [34] and holistic facial motions
[35, 21]. Given a video clip, Pan et al. [32] regard eye-blink detection as a
state transition problem then conditional graphical model is used to model
different stages. In [34], lip movement and lip-reading are treated as critical
cues for presentation attack detection. Bao et al. [21] distinguish planar
attack with real face based on motion correlation from optical flow field.
Kollreider et al. [35] employ an optical flow based model and a local Gabor
decomposition model for face motion estimation. However, these challenge-
response approaches require clients’ cooperations and the motion cues for
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presentation attack detection can be easily inferred.
(ii) It is demonstrated in [36] that local micro-texture is an useful cue for
detecting presentation attacks from re-captured images or videos. Maatta
et al. [37] present a novel micro-texture descriptor called Multi-Scale Local
Binary Patterns (MSLBP) for face presentation attack detection. Freitas
et al. [38] fuse space with time information into a single descriptor called
Local Binary Patterns from Three Orthogonal Planes (LBPTOP). Recently,
person-specific methods [39, 8] are proposed to improve the generalization
ability of micro-texture based algorithms. Zhang et al. [40] apply the Markov
model on color texture features then conduct recursive feature elimination
for face PAD. Boulkenafet et al. [7] focus on luminance and chrominance
channels where the joint information of color and texture is exploited. In [7],
the same authors propose a solution based on describing the facial appearance
by applying Fisher vector encoding on speeded-up robust features. However
micro-texture descriptor is low-level thus they are sensitive to illumination
changes and images with high quality.
(iii) Stereo structure based methods can be divided into two types: meth-
ods without extra hardware and methods requiring extra hardware. For the
first type, Maria et al. [24] exploit geometric invariants from a set of au-
tomatically located facial landmarks to estimate face structures. Given an
image sequence, Yang et al. [41] recover the sparse 3D structure from sev-
eral selected frames. Another type utilizes the depth information from depth
sensors such as Microsoft Kinect, to reconstruct face structures [42]. Wang
et al. [43] combine depth information from Kinect with texture features
learned from convolutional neural network. However it’s difficult to deploy
these presentation attack detection systems in real applications. In addition
stereo cues may be ineffective when confronting 3D mask attacks.
(iv) Rather than designing hand-crafted features for presentation attack
detection, Menotti et al. [26] build a robust PAD system for iris, face, and
fingerprint modalities based on convolutional neural networks with limited
biometric knowledge. Yang et al. [25] also utilize CNN models to learn deep
representations for face PAD task. Gustavo et al. [44] design the LBPnet,
in which LBP descriptor is integrated in the first layer of a convolutional
neural network then high-level texture features are extracted. Similarly we
also incorporate local descriptors with deep features for face PAD task. In
addition, to alleviate the problem of over-fitting, Rehman et al [45] proposes
a data randomization technique to train CNN classifiers on small-scale face
PAD datasets. Moreover, a cross-dataset face PAD algorithm [9] is proposed
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based on a two-stream CaffeNet, however its performance is not good.
(v) Context cues are also useful for face PAD. Komulainen et al. [46]
conduct face presentation attack detection by detecting the presentation at-
tack medium in the scene. Yan et al. [28] fuse multiple context cues such
as background consistency and scene shift. However, systems based on these
simple cues can be easily cheated hence they are unpractical.
Methods based on image quality analysis are also popular. Galbally et
al. [12] propose an method where image quality metrics are obtained by
evaluating prominent factors among 25 image quality measures. Inspired
by [12], Wen et al. [6] extract various image quality representations (spec-
ular reflection, blurriness, color diversity) for image distortion analysis and
extracted IDA descriptors characterize the inter-class difference. However,
these methods are not robust and relatively slow.
Some methods combine different cues mentioned above for PAD, including
our previous work [47]. Pan et al. [48] argue that the shift of background
scene and eye blinking are both important. Tronci et al. [49] utilize the joint
information of motion, texture and image quality to perform both sequential
and static liveness analysis. Feng et al. [50] propose a multi-cues integration
framework based on a hierarchical neural network to fuse image quality cues
with motion cues.
In this paper, we propose the representation combination of SPMT and
SSD to demonstrate the complementarity between local appearance descrip-
tors and context cues from convolutional neural network. In addition, we
propose the representation combination of SPMT and TFBD to demon-
strate the complementarity between appearance features and stereo structure
cues. Compared with our previous work [47], proposed descriptors SPMT
and TFBD are modified and refined. In addition, we are the first to utilize
SSD for face presentation attack detection, and we also propose a strategy
to confirm or correct the obscure liveness judgments.
3. Representation Combination “SPMT+SSD”
The pipeline is shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen, firstly an input image
is fed to SSD. SSD can locate all faces in a single image accurately, mean-
while corresponding labels and confidences are also provided. Secondly, the
uncertainty judgment is applied to each facial region. For instance, in Fig.
2, the liveness judgment for bounding box III is unreliable because its con-
fidence is lower than a previously set threshold. SPMT feature is extracted
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0.998
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0.85
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0.999ĉ
ĉ: Reliable box
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Ċ
ċ
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Real face
Ċ: Low confidence and
unreliable. Need SPMT
CropExtract
SPMT
SPMT
SVM
Fake face
Score: -0.97
Uncertainty judgment for
each facial bounding box
Wrong!
Figure 2: Architecture of the representation combination “SPMT+SSD”. The image is
only an example and not included in our dataset. The lower part of this figure is an
illustration of decision-level cascade strategy. SPMT feature is detailed in Fig. 3.
from an uncertain face (such as bounding box III) and the SVM output de-
cides whether the face is real or not. On the contrary, liveness judgments for
certain facial regions (such as bounding box I and II) can be used directly.
SPMT descriptor is detailed in Fig. 3. In this section, we will introduce
SPMT descriptor, SSD configuration for face presentation attack detection
and decision-level cascade strategy.
3.1. SPMT Feature
3.1.1. Basic Setup
First of all, facial regions should be properly cropped. There are two
different cropping methods. One method introduced in this section is de-
signed for “SPMT+SSD” and another introduced in Section 4 is designed
for “SPMT+TFBD”. As mentioned in cascade strategy, SPMT should be
extracted from uncertain facial regions, which are simply expanded by a ratio
of 1.1 to contain more facial boundaries that are discriminative as demon-
strated in [36]. Then the expanded facial region is cropped, resized to hf×wf
and converted to gray-scale, denoted as Fcr. Consistent with [36], we set hf
to 120 and wf to 100.
In addition, Local Binary Pattern (LBP) is adopted as the basic micro-
texture descriptor and LBPp,r denotes p sampled pixels are on a circular
neighborhood with a radius of r.
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Figure 3: Architecture of the representation combination “SPMT+TFBD”.
3.1.2. Fisher Face
Before illustrating encoding method, we would like to introduce Fisher
face, which plays an important role in high-level micro-texture encoding pro-
cess. Yang et al [36] first introduce Fisher ratio into presentation attack
detection. In our work, we will refer to their Fisher criterion analysis, mean-
while making some beneficial improvements. Inspired by the point that more
discriminative parts should be highlighted, Fisher ratio is assigned to each
position in Fcr, to characterize the difference of local micro-texture between
real and fake faces. Hence Fisher face Ffs owns a same size as Fcr.
Fcr is divided by non-overlapped 10× 10 blocks, in order to remain high-
frequency information for local difference encoding. Hence, Fcr is equivalent
to a hf/10 × wf/10 block matrix BM and the block matrix preserves the
global spatial layout. For each block, three kinds of LBP descriptors [37]
{LBP u8,1, LBP u8,2, LBP u16,2} are extracted. We concatenate three LBP his-
tograms as a 361 dimensional vector for each block. Difference of two blocks
is calculated by the χ2 distance between two vectors.
One thousand real faces and one thousand fake faces are randomly se-
lected from training set to construct Ffs. For block BMi,j, which denotes
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the block at position (i, j), we calculate differences between all pairs of BMi,j
among selected real faces, then compute their mean and variance: µgij, σ
g
ij.
In a similar way, µfij, σ
f
ij for fake faces are obtained. Mean and variance of
inter-class difference are denoted as µij, σij, calculated by all pairwise dis-
tances between two BMi,j in a real and a fake face respectively. Fisher ratio
for block BMi,j is derived by:
Rij =
(µgij + µ
f
ij − µij)2
σgij + σ
f
ij − σij
(1)
As can be seen, local neighborhood with small intra-class difference and large
inter-class difference is more discriminative.
After Fisher ratios of all BMi,j are calculated, bilinear interpolation is
applied to the Fisher ratio matrix, then we obtain a normalized hf × wf
Fisher face.
3.1.3. Low-Level Descriptor and Mid-level Encoding
After cropping facial region properly, we conduct low-level and mid-
level encoding. We adopt a MSLBP operator to capture diverse appear-
ance features with various scales, frequencies and orientations, illustrated as
{LBP8,1, LBP8,2, LBP8,3, LBP8,4, LBP16,2}. The MSLBP operator is applied
to each pixel in Fcr, obtaining MSLBP feature face Fmp, which is defined as
our low-level texture descriptor. Each pixel in Fmp is 48-bit long.
Afterwards, we design a MSLBP codebook CB with a capacity of Ncb and
use KD-tree generating algorithm to train this codebook. All positive and
negative Fmp in training set are used, but only a portion of pixels in each Fmp
are adopted for training. The k-th texton in CB is notated as CBk, hence
codebook is denoted as {CBk|1 ≤ k ≤ Ncb}. Each texton is 48-bit long. In
our final settings, Ncb = 256.
Then the mid-level texture descriptor called BOVW (Bag of Visual Words)
code face Fbw is introduced. BOVW coding algorithm in Eq. (2) is applied
to each pixel in Fmp, obtaining a hf × wf BOVW code face:
F
(i,j)
bw = arg min
k
||F (i,j)mp − CBk||2 (2)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ Ncb, F (i,j)bw denotes the BOVW code value at position (i, j) in
Fbw, F
(i,j)
mp denotes the 48-bit MSLBP feature vector at position (i, j) in Fmp.
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3.1.4. Spatial Pyramid and the First Part of High-Level Encoding
Based on the mid-level texture descriptor and pre-trained Fisher face,
we conduct high-level encoding based on specifically designed spatial pyra-
mid. Inspired by Spatial Pyramid Matching [51], a high-level spatial pyramid
coding algorithm is proposed. In the classical spatial pyramid, the grid at
level l has 2l pieces along each spatial dimension. However this partitioning
method is not appropriate for facial regions. If doing so, facial components
will be split chaotically and structure information will be lost. Hence we
design a specific spatial pyramid to partition the facial region, preserving the
symmetries of facial components.
Level 0 of spatial pyramid represents the whole facial region. At level 1,
facial region is divided into 3×2 sub-regions. So sizes of sub-regions at level 1
are {hf/4×wf/2, hf/4×wf/2, hf/2×wf/2, hf/2×wf/2, hf/4×wf/2, hf/4×
wf/2} respectively. From level 2, partitioning is as same as the traditional
method. Let F sbw,l, F
s
fs,l denote the s-th sub-region at level l in BOVW code
face and Fisher face respectively.
The first part of high-level encoding is constructing BOVW histograms
for all sub-regions, which are weighted by Fisher face:
BHsl [k] =
1
|F sbw,l|
∑
(i,j)∈F sbw,l
F
s,(i,j)
fs,l I(F
s,(i,j)
bw,l = k) (3)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ Ncb, I(·) is the indicator function, operator | · | counts pixel
numbers, BHsl denotes the weighted BOVW histogram of the s-th subregion
at level l.
In our experiments, we construct two-level pyramids on both Fbw and
Ffs, hence 7 regions and 7 BOVW histograms are obtained in total.
3.1.5. Class-Specific Face and the Second Part of High-Level Encoding
Next, we will introduce the second part of high-level encoding for SPMT
descriptor, based on proposed class-specific face. The class-specific face Fcs
is defined to characterize intra-class similarities. Genuine-specific face Fcs,g
characterizes the most common BOVW value at each position among gen-
uine faces. Fake-specific face Fcs,f can be interpreted in a similar way. For
simplicity, we denote all genuine faces and all fake faces in training set as Ωg
and Ωf respectively. The class-specific face is derived by:
F (i,j)cs,γ = arg max
k
∑
q∈Ωγ
I(F
(i,j)
bw
q
= k) (4)
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In Eq. (4), 1 ≤ k ≤ Ncb, γ = g or f . F (i,j)bw
q
denotes BOVW code at position
(i, j) of the q-th sample among Ωγ. The two-level pyramid is also applied on
Fcs,g and Fcs,f , obtaining 7 regions each, denoted as {F scs,γ,l}.
We also define the positive matching-degree vector and negative matching-
degree vector, in order to capture face’s similarities with two class-specific
faces. Similarities can be measured in all sub-regions weighted by Fisher
face. The matching degree vector is derived by:
M sγ,l[k] =

1 f sl [k] = 0 && c
s
γ,l[k] = 0
min(
f sl [k]
csγ,l[k]
,
csγ,l[k]
f sl [k]
) others
(5)
where k ∈ [1, Ncb], l denotes the pyramid level, s denotes the s-th subregion,
γ = g or f indicates matching with genuine or fake specific face, f sl [k] denotes
occurrence frequency of the k-th texton in facial region weighted by Fisher ra-
tio: f sl [k] =
∑
(i,j)∈F sbw,l F
s,(i,j)
fs,l I(F
s,(i,j)
bw,l = k), c
s
γ,l[k] denotes the corresponding
frequency in class specific face: csγ,l[k] =
∑
(i,j)∈F scs,γ,l F
s,(i,j)
fs,l I(F
s,(i,j)
cs,γ,l = k).
Two matching-degree vectors are constructed for each subregion and then
normalized. Finally, we concatenate 7 BOVW histograms and 14 matching-
degree vectors from all sub-regions as the SPMT descriptor. In our final
settings, each SPMT feature vector is 5376 dimensional then it’s reduced to
1024 dimension by PCA algorithm.
3.2. SSD for Face Presentation Attack detection
3.2.1. Why We Choose SSD
SSD discretizes the output space of each feature map to conduct position
regression for facial region. Those multiple feature maps with varied reso-
lutions and hierarchies naturally provide diverse semantical descriptions to
conduct liveness judgement. The pipeline for traditional presentation attack
detection includes two stages: firstly detect and crop facial region and then
extract features. However the pipeline for SSD based presentation attack
detection method is end-to-end.
3.2.2. Task Configuration
Label 0 is assigned to anchor boxes that only contain background infor-
mation. Label 1 and label 2 are assigned to anchor boxes containing a real
face and a fake face respectively. Then, SSD converts the face presentation
attack detection to a classical detection problem with three categories.
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In four datasets that we use, most images only contain one face. For
these images, liveness judgment is the label of output bounding box after
non-maximum suppression. However for those images containing multiple
faces, more than one output bounding boxes exist. Then we should manually
check the liveness judgments under this situation.
3.2.3. Multi-Scale Anchor Boxes
SSD arranges a set of anchor boxes with several fixed aspect ratios and
scales on each predicted layer. The scales of anchor boxes can be calculated
by:
sci = scmin +
(i− 1)× (scmax − scmin)
max− 1 (6)
where i ∈ [2,max−1], max denotes amount of predicted layers, scmin, sci, scmax
represent scales of anchor boxes at lowest, the i-th and the highest predicted
layer respectively.
3.2.4. Training Samples Selection
In training set, anchor boxes with label 1 or 2 are “positive samples”,
negative training samples are the anchor boxes with label 0.
To obtain positive training samples, we firstly find the largest overlapped
anchor box with each ground truth. Afterwards we regard an anchor box
whose overlap ratio with any ground truth is larger than a threshold (0.5), as
a positive sample. All remaining samples are regarded as potential negative
training samples. The hard negative mining strategy is utilized, in which
those with higher confidences are selected as negative training samples. The
ratio between negative and positive training samples is 3:1 .
3.2.5. Data Augmentation for Training
Powerful data augmentation strategy is utilized to enhance shift invari-
ance and scale invariance. For each input image, cropping and expanding op-
erations are used randomly, meanwhile overlap ratio between each cropped or
expanded anchor box and corresponding ground truth should be larger than
a threshold. Rotation operation is adopted at a certain probability (0.5).
3.3. Decision-Level Cascade Strategy
We define two kinds of uncertain facial bounding box. For the first kind,
an output bounding box δ1 may be judged as a real face with a high con-
fidence, however another bounding box δ2 which has a large overlap ratio
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with δ1 is judged as a fake face also with a high confidence. For the second
kind, the detection confidence of a bounding box δ3 is lower than a certainty
threshold θc after NMS. We call δ1, δ2, δ3 uncertain bounding boxes and cor-
responding liveness judgments from SSD can not be used. In this situation,
SPMT descriptor should be extracted from facial regions and the outputs
from SVM decide whether these faces are real or not.
An certain facial bounding box always has a high confidence after NMS.
In this situation, liveness judgment from SSD can be used directly as the
final decision because it’s reliable.
The second uncertainty metric is adopted and θc is tuned on develop-
ment set (θc = 0.92). Through the cascade strategy, SPMT descriptor and
SSD framework are demonstrated complementary, hence the excellent per-
formance is achieved.
4. Representation Combination “SPMT+TFBD”
The pipeline is shown in Fig. 3. Firstly TFBD feature is extracted from a
binocular image pair. Each detected facial landmark is augmented with the
third dimension of relative depth, then it is transformed based on template
face registration algorithm to match corresponding landmark in template
face. After several rounds of iterative optimizations, TFBD descriptor is
extracted. At the same time, SPMT feature is extracted from right image.
Finally score fusion of two SVM outputs determines the classification result.
In this section, we mainly focus on introducing TFBD descriptor. Some
supplemental descriptions for SPMT and classification are also provided.
4.1. TFBD Feature
4.1.1. Basic Setup
Firstly we set up unparallel dual cameras then stereo calibration is con-
ducted. “Left image” and “right image” are obtained at the same time. We
utilize the regressing local binary features [52] to locate NP (in this method
NP = 68) facial landmarks and obtain their pixel coordinates in both left
and right images. Point based distortion correction algorithm is then applied
to each landmark, and finally stereo rectification is conducted.
4.1.2. Original Landmark Depth
In the first place, the depth of all facial landmarks should be calculated
and some notations are defined as follows. Rc is defined as the rotation
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matrix and tc represents the translation vector. Mr = {fxr, cxr, fyr, cyr} and
Ml are defined as the intrinsic matrices of right and left cameras respectively.
pl = [ul, vl, 1]
T and pr = [ur, vr, 1]
T are homogeneous pixel coordinates of a
certain landmark in left and right images respectively. The coordinate of
a certain landmark under right camera’s coordinate system is denoted as
prw = [xrw, yrw, zrw, 1]
T . An intermediate matrix M is defined as M =
Ml
[
Rc tc
0T 1
]
.
According to the pinhole camera model, the original depth of a certain
facial landmark is calculated by:
zrw =
B12b2 −B22b1
ur−cxr
fxr
(B12B21 −B11B22) + (B12B23 −B22B13) (7)
where B1j = m1j −m3jul, B2j = m2j −m3jvl, b1 = m34ul−m14, b2 = m34vl−
m24 and mij represents the element at position (i, j) in matrix M .
4.1.3. 3-D Abstract Facial Landmark and Template Face
We define the 3-D abstract landmark based on the original facial land-
mark, which is very important for TFBD feature and registration opera-
tion. Each face can be represented by a set of NP abstract landmarks:
{pj|pj = [xj, yj, dj]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ NP}, where the first and the second dimensions
are pixel coordinates and the third dimension denotes relative depth. As il-
lustrated in the next section, abstract landmarks are transformed in each
registration round. Original abstract landmark p1j is defined for the first-
round registration, where x1j , y
1
j are pixel coordinate of the j-th landmark in
right image and d1j = z
j
rw − (
∑
j z
j
rw)/NP (z
j
rw denotes original depth of the
j-th facial landmark).
For both real and fake faces, intra-class difference of stereo structure is
quite large due to various poses. Consequently a standard real face structure
is needed: when the face is similar to this standard structure after a sort
of transformation, the face is more likely to be a real face. We name this
standard face as template face, which serves as a stereo structure benchmark
for face presentation attack detection, as shown in Fig. 4.
Template face is obtained before training. We sample NI image pairs
from 5 different people, sitting with varied but moderate distance away from
cameras. We set NI to 20 and distance to {50cm,60cm,70cm,80cm}. All
cameras should be exactly opposite to people’s faces when collecting image
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Mobile
IPAD
Print
Real
  
Calculate Depth
. . .
20 Pairs
Directly Face Cameras
Average
Template Face
Match
Match
Match
Match
Normalized Average Registration
Errors Within All Training Genuine Faces
Iteration Round IndexIteration Round Index
(a) (b)
(d)(c)
  
Calculate Depth
  
Calculate Depth
Calculate Depth
  
60 cm away
Normalized Average Registration
Errors Within All Training Fake Faces
Figure 4: (a) Examples of our dataset. (b) Description of template face and registration.
(c) and (d) describe iterative registration errors. Generally genuine face can match the
template face better with a lower error, which is a powerful cue for classification. All
errors have been normalized.
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pairs for template face. As shown in Fig. 4, facial landmarks are located
most precisely and depth calculation is most accurate under this situation.
Template face T is represented by a set of standard abstract landmarks :
{Tj|Tj = [T xj , T yj , T dj ]T , 1 ≤ j ≤ NP}. x1,ij , y1,ij are notated as pixel coordinate
of the j-th facial landmark in the i-th right picture among NI sampled pairs,
and d1,ij represents corresponding original relative depth:
T xj =
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
x1,ij , T
y
j =
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
y1,ij , T
d
j =
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
d1,ij (8)
4.1.4. Template Face Registration Algorithm
As mentioned above, a sort of transformation should be defined for the
original face, to match template face until the “closest” degree. This transfor-
mation is named as template face registration. As shown in Fig. 4, matching
error distribution is different among real and fake faces. Hence the TFBD
descriptor will utilize this important cue for classification. In a word, ideal
registration transformation seeks for optimal parameters to obtain minimal
registration error:
arg min
sF ,RF ,tF
NP∑
j=1
‖ Tj − sFRF × pj − tF ‖2 (9)
where sF denotes scaling factor, pj denotes the j-th abstract landmark, RF
and tF denote rotation matrix and translation vector for abstract landmark.
Solving the optimal parameter in Eq. (9) directly has poor accuracy.
Hence we propose a template face registration algorithm, which is based
on unit quaternion absolute orientation method proposed in [53]. We modify
the algorithm in [53] and propose an iterative optimization method. Optimal
parameters are estimated by multiple rounds of iterative correction, rather
than by single-round calculation.
Single-round registration is defined as:
pn+1j = s
n
F
∗RnF
∗ × pnj + tnF ∗ (10)
where n (n ≥ 1) represents the registration round and RnF ∗, snF ∗, tnF ∗ de-
note optimal parameters in the n-th round. Each abstract landmark pnj is
transformed to pn+1j after the n-th registration round.
Our point-based iteration method combines the iterative closest point
(ICP) algorithm with bootstrapping. We design an abstract landmark pool
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Po, then (snF
∗, RnF
∗, tnF
∗) can be solved based on Pon (the pool used in the
n-th round). Each pn+1j is calculated according to Eq. (10), meanwhile NP
registration errors in this round are obtained: enj =‖ Tj − pn+1j ‖2. Then all
errors are normalized. Afterwards we select Nmin abstract landmarks with
minimal registration error to build Pon+1 for the next-round registration.
We assign weight for each landmark in Pon+1(n ≥ 1) to highlight the
hard examples:
wn+1j = ln
enj
1− enj
(11)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ Nmin, wn+1j denotes weight of the j-th landmark in Pon+1.
Afterwards all weights should be normalized.
The Nmin landmarks in Po
n+1(n ≥ 1) has good statistical properties
because of small registration errors. Meanwhile according to the idea of
bootstrapping, a landmark with a larger error should be assigned with a
higher weight for next-round registration. In our final settings, Nmin = 30,
Po1 contains all NP original abstract landmarks and w
1
j = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ NP ).
Then for the n-th registration round, we use the modified unit quaternion
based absolute orientation method to solve the following problem:
arg min
snF ,R
n
F ,t
n
F
∑
pnj ∈Pon
(wnj )
2‖ Tj − snFRnF × pnj − tnF ‖2 (12)
Firstly we define T
′
j = w
n
j Tj, p
′n
j = w
n
j p
n
j . Considering t
n
F is same for each
landmark, we define t
′n
F = w
n
j t
n
F to approximate the t
n
F , where w
n
j denotes
the average weight among {wnj }. Then Eq. (12) is converted to the standard
form as Eq. (13).
arg min
snF ,R
n
F ,t
′n
F
∑
pnj ∈Pon
‖ errj ‖2
s.t. errj = T
′
j − snFRnF × p′nj − t′nF
(13)
Next we denote T
′
j and p
′n
j as centroids of T
′
j and p
′n
j respectively. We use
the basic algorithm in [53] to solve Eq. (13), then snF
∗ and tnF
∗ are obtained:
snF
∗ =
∑
pnj ∈Pon
(T
′
j − T ′j )T · (RnF ∗ × (p′nj − p′nj ))∑
pnj ∈Pon
‖ (p′nj − p′nj ) ‖
2 (14)
tnF
∗ = (T ′j − snF ∗RnF ∗ × p′nj )/wnj (15)
17
Algorithm 1 Template Face Registration Algorithm
Input:
NP original abstract landmarks: {p1j |1 ≤ j ≤ NP}
Template face T = {Tj|1 ≤ j ≤ NP}
Round index n = 1, nmax = 20
Output: NP dimensional TFBD descriptor.
1: Initialize landmark pool: Po1 ← {p1j}, w1j = 1.
2: while n ≤ nmax do
3: Based on Pon, solve (snF
∗,tnF
∗,RnF
∗) according to the Eq. (12), (13),
(14) and (15)
4: pn+1j = s
n
F
∗RnF
∗ × pnj + tnF ∗, for 1 ≤ j ≤ NP
5: enj =‖ Tj − pn+1j ‖2, for 1 ≤ j ≤ NP
6: Select Nmin landmarks with minimal errors
7: Update Pon+1 with Nmin selected landmarks
8: Update weight wn+1j according to Eq. (11)
9: end while
10: Concatenate {dnmax+1j |1 ≤ j ≤ NP} as TFBD descriptor
where ‘·’ represents the dot product operation.
Finally, according to [53], rotation matrix is equivalent to an unit quater-
nion. Let q˚∗ = q0 + iqx + yqy + kqz denote the optimal unit quaternion. To
solve q˚∗, we define a matrix Q =
∑
pnj ∈Pon(p
′n
j − p′nj )× (T ′j −T ′j )T and a 4× 4
matrix Q
′
. As illustrated in Section 4.A, p7, [53], Q
′
= φ(Q) where φ(·)
is a matrix transformation operator, meanwhile q˚∗ equals to the eigenvector
corresponding to the maximal eigenvalue of matrix Q
′
. Once q˚∗ is obtained,
RnF
∗ can be solved by transforming q˚∗ according to Section 3.E, p6, [53].
After nmax registration rounds, NP transformed relative depth from NP
abstract landmarks are concatenated as NP dimensional TFBD descriptor.
In our final settings, nmax = 20 and TFBD feature is 68 dimensional. The
overall template face registration algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
4.2. Supplemental Statements for SPMT and Classification
Facial region cropping method is different from Sec.3. A face detector
based on cascade detection method [54] is employed, meanwhile two eyes are
also located. Initially detected facial region can not be used directly because
it always contains too much background disturbances. Consistent with [36],
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Deye is defined as the pixel distance between two eyes, the width of cropped
facial region Wf is 1.6Deye and the average of Hf/Wf ratio is 1.2. A Hf×Wf
facial region is then cropped. Finally it’s also resized to hf×wf as in Sec.3.1.
TFBD feature and SPMT feature are individually fed to corresponding
nonlinear SVM classifiers. Score fusion of two SVM outputs determines the
classification result.
5. Experiments
5.1. Datasets and Decoding Process
Four datasets are used in our experiments, including three public datasets:
NUAA dataset [10], CASIA dataset [55] and Replay-Attack dataset [56]. As
no binocular camera based dataset for face presentation attack detection is
publicly available, we construct our own dataset.
5.1.1. NUAA Dataset
It contains 12641 still images. Warped photos with different sizes serve
as presentation attacks.
5.1.2. CASIA Dataset
It contains 600 videos from 50 subjects in total and covers three kinds of
attacks (photo, cut photo, video). For each subject, images of real face and
three attacks are captured under three image qualities (low, normal and high
qualities). Hence 12 videos are captured for each subject.
5.1.3. Replay-Attack Dataset
Replay-Attack dataset contains 50 subjects and 1300 videos in total. For
each subject, there are two kinds of shooting background (control and ad-
verse), three kinds of attacks (print, digital photo and video), two attacking
manners (fixed and hand-holding).
5.1.4. Our Dataset
Our dataset is consisted of binocular image pairs, sampled with two fixed
and calibrated web cameras with resolution of 640 × 480. The distance be-
tween binocular camera is 12cm. As shown in Table 1, 15 people are invited,
three kinds of presentation attack exist and 60 fake faces are collected in
total. Each person is required to raise head, lower head, rotate face, sit with
different positions and varied distance away from cameras. For each fake face,
19
Table 1: Compositions of our dataset
Our Dataset Genuine
Spoofing
Photo IPAD Cellphone
Image pairs 6000 3000 1500 1500
Subjects 15 30 15 15
Our dataset is collected using two 640×480 web cameras.
Table 2: Divisions of four datasets after decoding
Dataset NUAA CASIA REPLAY Ours
Training Subjects 8 20 15 7+25
Training Images (Pairs) 3491 45000 93000 5300
Test Images (Pairs) 9150 57000 124000 6700
Development Set Images N/A N/A 93000 (15) N/A
’N/A’ means that development set is not divided.
we move it horizontally, vertically, back and front, and rotate it in depth,
under different illumination conditions and varied distance. Especially for
those printed attacks, we also bend them inward and outward. There are
12000 image pairs in total.
5.1.5. Decoding Videos into Frames
Considering our algorithms are conducted on single images or image pairs,
we use each frame in a video. This operation is called “decoding the video”.
Training, test and evaluation are all conducted on still images. CASIA and
REPLAY-ATTACK datasets need to be decoded because they are composed
of videos. CASIA dataset contains 102000 frames and REPLAY-ATTACK
contains 310000 frames in total.
5.1.6. Dataset Division
Three public datasets are divided according to [10, 55, 56]. As shown in
Table 2, ‘7+25’ denotes 7 real faces and 25 fake faces are selected for training
and ‘93000(15)’ means that development set of REPLAY-ATTACK contains
93000 single images from 15 subjects.
5.2. Performance Measures
To compare with previous works, we adopt Accuracy, Area Under ROC
Curve (AUC) [36], Equal Error Rate (EER) [36] that corresponds to the point
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where false rejection rate (FRR) is equal to false acceptance rate (FAR) in
ROC curve, True positive rate (TPR) when FAR is 0.1 ([6]) and HTER [56].
Reporting PAD results using only HTER and EER can be biased. Hence
to use standardised metrics for evaluation, we follow the ISO standard (ISO/IEC
30107 [57]) and report Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER)
and Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER).
5.3. Training and Test Protocols
For representation combination “SPMT+SSD”, experiments are conducted
on three public datasets. However we can only conduct experiments on our
dataset for “SPMT+TFBD”, because TFBD descriptor is extracted from a
binocular image pair.
We use LIBSVM [58] to train SVM. For TFBD feature, the category of
SVM is “ν-SVC” and RBF kernel is used, because TFBD descriptor is only
68 dimensional and RBF kernel is needed for high dimensional mapping. For
SPMT feature, we also use “ν-SVC”. We use 5-fold cross validation method
to tune hyper-parameters and determine the classification thresholds.
For SSD, we do not tune any hyper-parameters on development set or by
K-fold cross validation. All hyper-parameters of network are set empirically,
which may not be optimal. However networks with these parameters still
achieve nearly perfect performance, revealing the great robustness of SSD
for presentation attack detection.
5.4. Experimental Setup
For two hand-crafted descriptors, all hyper-parameters in our final set-
tings are described above. For SSD, the input image is resized to 300× 300
(500 × 500 for NUAA particularly). We use conv6 2, conv7 2, conv8 2 and
conv9 2 for prediction. scmin is set to 0.2 and scmax is set to 0.9. We train the
network for 20000 iterations with a learning rate of 10−2, which is reduced
to 10−3 at 30000 iterations and 10−4 at 40000 iterations. Batch size is 32.
We train and test models on a single NVIDIA Titan-X GPU.
5.5. Experiments of the Representation Combination “SPMT+SSD”
We conduct experiments on three public datasets. For CASIA dataset,
we consider seven scenarios including Low Quality (LQ), Methodrate Quality
(MQ), High Quality (HQ), Warped Photo (WP), Cut Photo(CP), Video
Photo (VP) and Overall test according to the protocols in [55]. For REPLAY
dataset, we consider seven scenarios including Prints, Mobile, Highdef IPAD
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Table 3: Performance of the representation combination “SPMT+SSD” on NUAA
dataset using frame based evaluation metric (Accuracy(%), EER(%), AUC)
Other Descriptors Ours
Metric
Tan’s MSLBP Context Yang’s LBPnet
SPMT SSD
SPMT
[10] [37] [46] [36] [44] +SSD
Accuracy 88.15 92.76 97.13 97.78 98.20 98.05 99.00 99.16
AUC 0.941 0.990 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.999 1.000 1.000
EER 13.95 4.84 2.73 1.96 1.80 1.85 1.10 0.89
(HD), Digital photo (DP), Photo, Video and Overall test according to the
protocols in [56]. For each scenario in CASIA and Replay-Attack datasets,
we use corresponding subset to train models then conduct evaluation.
5.5.1. Evaluation of SPMT Descriptor
Results on NUAA dataset. We make comparisons with four tradi-
tional methods, including a re-image theory based method [10], a contex-
tual cue based method [46] and two micro-texture based methods [37, 36].
MSLBP [37] is a state-of-the-art low-level descriptor and Yang’s component
dependent descriptor [36] is a state-of-the-art mid-level descriptor. As shown
in Table 3, our SPMT feature outperforms other traditional descriptors in
the literature. We also compare with a convolutional neural network based
method [44]. Our SPMT descriptor is slightly worse than deep texture de-
scriptor from LBPnet [44].
Results on CASIA dataset. As most state-of-the-art methods don’t
report APCER and BPCER for seven scenarios, we only report the perfor-
mance of our methods, as shown in Table 4. The performance for low quality
(LQ) is better than higher quality (HQ). This result is expected because fake
faces with high-quality usually contain less artifacts. Video presentation at-
tacks are easy to classify due to the inevitable downsize of high-resolution.
Results on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset. In Table 5, an APCER
of 9.4% and a BPCER of 8.3% are obtained on the whole test set, which
demonstrates the effectiveness of our spatial pyramid encoding algorithm.
However as shown in Table 6, our SPMT doesn’t achieve state-of-the-art
performance due to the local feature’s limitations.
Discussion. Our SPMT descriptor focuses on encoding local micro-
texture and the results reveal that SPMT outperforms other local descriptors
in the term of representation capability.
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Table 4: Performance of the representation combination “SPMT+SSD” on CASIA
dataset using frame based evaluation metric (APCER and BPCER)
Our Descriptors
Scenario
Test
Metric(%) SPMT SSD
SPMT+
Images SSD
LQ
14.1k fake APCER 1.42 0.85 0.45
4.6k real BPCER 1.56 0.58 0.34
MQ
13.4k fake APCER 5.83 0.01 0.00
4.3k real BPCER 5.01 0.00 0.00
HQ
15.1k fake APCER 7.39 0.58 0.35
4.9k real BPCER 3.55 0.27 0.20
WP
16.9k fake APCER 8.11 0.75 0.56
13.8k real BPCER 3.02 0.19 0.14
CP
12.8k fake APCER 6.83 0.67 0.31
13.8k real BPCER 2.52 0.12 0.09
VP
13.4k fake APCER 1.50 0.11 0.05
13.8k real BPCER 0.45 0.04 0.01
Overall
43.1k fake APCER 10.67 0.16 0.10
13.8k real BPCER 6.77 0.07 0.04
Table 5: Performance of representation combination “SPMT+SSD” on REPLAY-
ATTACK dataset using frame based evaluation metric (APCER and BPCER)
Our Descriptors
Scenario
Test
Metric(%) SPMT SSD
SPMT+
Images SSD
Print
18.8k fake APCER 6.91 0.04 0.00
30.0k real BPCER 1.96 0.01 0.00
Mobile
37.6k fake APCER 7.50 0.16 0.05
30.0k real BPCER 3.64 0.04 0.03
HD
37.6k fake APCER 10.99 0.01 0.01
30.0k real BPCER 5.81 0.00 0.00
Photo
56.4k fake APCER 8.50 0.17 0.06
30.0k real BPCER 5.66 0.07 0.04
DP
37.6k fake APCER 4.97 0.13 0.10
30.0k real BPCER 4.74 0.05 0.03
Video
37.6k fake APCER 6.38 1.19 1.07
30.0k real BPCER 2.97 0.42 0.27
Overall
94.0k fake APCER 9.43 0.09 0.04
30.0k real BPCER 8.14 0.08 0.03
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DET Curve on NUAA Dataset                                        DET Curve on CASIA Dataset                          DET Curve on REPLAY-ATTACK Dataset
Figure 5: DET curves of the representation combination “SPMT+SSD” on NUAA, CASIA
and REPLAY-ATTACK datasets.
5.5.2. Evaluation of SSD
Results. Images from NUAA dataset are resized to 500× 500 for training
because NUAA training set contains only 3400 images. Using larger images
for training can ease the problem of overfitting.
For CASIA and REPLAY-ATTACK datasets, the size of 300 × 300 is
adopted for training because training set is large enough. 300 × 300 model
is 2.4 times faster than 500 × 500 model. As shown in Table 4 and 5, the
APCER on total test test is 0.16% for CASIA and 0.09% for REPLAY-
ATTACK respectively, which already outperform other methods significantly.
But there’s still room for improvement, because SSD mainly utilizes global
context cues while neglects local features in the facial region.
Comparisons with other deep learning based methods. We in-
dividually compare SSD with deep learning based PAD methods ([25, 26]).
As shown in Table 6, SSD outperforms other deep networks on CASIA and
REPLAY-ATTACK datasets significantly.
Discussion. As can be seen from Table 3, SSD doesn’t achieve such
amazing performance on NUAA dataset, because training set is too small,
data diversity is limited and the image quality is quite poor.
5.5.3. Evaluation of the combination “SPMT+SSD”
Results. As shown in Table 3, 4 and 5, our proposed face PAD method
achieves accuracies of more than 99% on all datasets and scenarios. The first
representation combination “SPMT+SSD” achieves the best performance on
NUAA dataset, outperforming the deep texture model LBPnet [44]. On CA-
SIA and REPLAY-ATTACK datasets, the overall APCER and BPCER are
lower than 0.1%, demonstrating the effectiveness of proposed representation
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Table 6: Comparisons between the “SPMT+SSD” and state-of-the-art methods
on CASIA/REPLAY-ATTACK benchmarks using frame based evaluation metric
Method
REPLAY CASIA Speed
HTER EER EER TPR(%)
fps
(%) (%) (%) FAR=0.1
LBP+LDA [23] 19.62 18.25 21.01 75.7 5.2
IQA [59] 15.23 - 32.46 - -
CDD [36] 10.32 9.75 11.85 88.8 2.5
SPMT 9.85 9.37 11.29 88.5 1.5
Dynamic [14] 7.65 6.76 10.00 89.1 -
IDA [6] 7.41 - 12.97 86.7 3.8
IQM [60] 5.23 - - - -
Person [8] 3.62 1.55 1.63 - -
Color [7] 2.81 0.42 2.17 - -
CNN [25] 2.75 - 6.27 - -
SpoofNet [26] 0.75 - - - 69.0
SSD 0.09 0.07 0.08 100.0 120.0
SPMT + SSD 0.06 0.04 0.04 100.0 45.5
- The value is not provided in corresponding paper.
combination for 2D face PAD problem. We also present DET curves in Fig.
5. As can be seen, performance on single dataset is excellent.
Discussion. Our micro-texture descriptor is highly complementary with
deep network SSD, hence local features in the facial region and context cues
of the scene can be both utilized. Also the proposed decision-level cascade
strategy provides double insurance for face PAD task.
5.5.4. Comparisons with the State-of-the-Art Methods
NUAA dataset is not considered in this section because few state-of-
the-art methods report experimental results on it. As most state-of-the-art
methods don’t report the standardised metrics as Table 4, we use HTER,
EER and TPR to compare different PAD methods on CASIA and REPLAY-
ATTACK datasets. In Table 6, based on frame based evaluation metric, the
representation combination “SPMT+SSD” for face PAD outperforms other
state-of-the-art methods. There are only 50 wrongly judged images in CASIA
and 49 wrongly judged images in REPLAY-ATTACK dataset.
5.5.5. Computation Cost Analysis
The speed of each method reported in Table 6 is tested on CASIA dataset
and the image resolution is 480×640. For SPMT, we use a modified cascade
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Table 7: Comparisons of micro-texture descriptors on our dataset
Metric
DOG Tan’s MSLBP Context Yang’s SPMT
[55] [10] [37] [46] [36] (Ours)
Accuracy(%) 83.72 85.85 89.47 92.16 94.71 94.83
AUC 0.849 0.871 0.917 0.958 0.975 0.978
EER(%) 16.13 14.23 12.91 8.47 6.15 6.02
detector [61] from Matlab Toolbox to detect face and the speed is 0.08s.
Then SPMT descriptor is extracted and the speed is 0.58s. Hence the total
time is 0.66s per image (1.5 fps). For end-to-end SSD, the system runs at
120 fps without proposals. For “SPMT+SSD”, SSD is cascaded with SPMT
descriptor when uncertain judgements appear. Uncertain judgements are
quite rare but they still slow down the whole system to 45.5 fps in average.
SPMT is tested on a CPU with 32 GB memory and SSD is tested on
a NVIDIA Titan-X GPU. “SPMT+SSD” runs on both CPU and GPU.
SpoofNet [26] is tested on a NVIDIA TITAN GPU while LBP [23], CDD
[36] and IDA [6] are tested on a modern CPU.
5.6. Experiments of the Representation Combination “SPMT+TFBD”
5.6.1. Performance of SPMT on Our Dataset
The results are shown in Table 7. The performance of all descriptors is
worse than their performance on NUAA dataset, but our SPMT still out-
performs others. It’s not surprising because our dataset is more challenging
than NUAA because of different head poses and distance during collection.
When face is rotated or far away from camera, it is difficult to locate facial
region accurately and more background disturbances are included. In order
to reduce the sensitivity, binocular depth feature should also be utilized.
5.6.2. Experiments of TFBD Feature and the Combination “SPMT+TFBD”
Results shown in Table 8 reveal that original depth feature is somewhat
discriminative, however when face is increasingly far from cameras, relative
depth difference between different landmarks is reduced. Performance also
becomes worse when face in front of camera is rotated due to the inaccurate
landmark locations. After matched with template face, normalized binocular
depth feature can reflect the face stereo structure. The obvious decline in
APCER and BPCER proves the effectiveness of TFBD feature. But TFBD
feature is sensitive to some presentation attacks which are very similar to
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Table 8: Performance of the combination “SPMT+TFBD” on our dataset
Operator Original TFBD SPMT SPMT+
depth feature feature TFBD
APCER(%) 22.21 10.28 8.11 5.95
BPCER(%) 7.12 4.18 2.34 2.05
EER(%) 14.35 8.12 6.02 3.53
real faces. Hence SPMT feature is introduced and effectiveness is proved by
the APCER of 8.11%. However, limitation also exists when there are too
much background disturbances or image quality is high. Hence we combine
TFBD descriptor with SPMT descriptor eventually. As can be seen, APCER
finally drops to 5.95% and EER drops to 3.53. Score fusion ratio is 1 : 1.
5.7. Aggregate Dataset Experiments
In prior work [7, 14, 27], when conducting cross-dataset experiments, the
model is trained on one dataset and then test on other datasets. In a degree,
it’s not meaningful because the generalization ability should be proved in
real applications under various situations, rather than measured on a single
dataset. Both training and test data should be diverse enough to mimic real
scenarios. In addition, convolutional neural networks own powerful fitting
abilities. Advantages of deep networks will be wasted if only one dataset is
adopted for training.
Hence to demonstrate the generalization ability of our proposed repre-
sentation combination “SPMT+SSD” for face PAD, we conduct aggregate
dataset experiments, as shown in Table 9. SPMT, SSD and “SPMT+SSD”
are trained on three public datasets, which are then used for evaluation. We
randomly select 10000 real faces and 10000 fake faces from three datasets
to train aggregate dataset models. Aggregate dataset performance of SSD
and the combination “SPMT+SSD” on CASIA dataset is worse than single
dataset performance (Table 4). It is acceptable because SSD’s fitting ability
is too powerful for a single dataset. Excellent aggregate dataset results on
three benchmarks prove that any feature representation under any scenario
can be learned by cascading deep network with our local descriptor SPMT.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In today’s biometric authentication systems, diverse threats of presen-
tation attacks are increasing. In order to obtain robust solutions for face
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Table 9: Aggregate dataset experiments
Train Test Method HTER(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%)
NUAA
SPMT 9.43 11.61 5.45
SSD 0.78 1.10 0.51
On All SPMT+SSD 0.72 1.04 0.43
Three
REPLAY
SPMT 14.27 13.08 9.35
Public SSD 0.07 0.08 0.05
Datasets SPMT+SSD 0.05 0.04 0.04
CASIA
SPMT 15.36 15.10 12.35
SSD 0.28 0.35 0.29
SPMT+SSD 0.25 0.30 0.26
PAD, two kinds of discriminative representation combinations are proposed
in this paper. The first combination incorporates local appearance features,
along with global context cues from deep networks. The complementar-
ity between SPMT descriptor and SSD framework, as well as the proposed
decision-level cascade strategy, make the combination very effective for pre-
venting 2D presentation attacks. Excellent experimental results on single-
dataset and aggregate-dataset, especially the APCER which is lower than
0.1%, demonstrate its effectiveness and generalization ability. The second
combination cooperates binocular depth information with appearance fea-
tures. The proposed template face registration method can effectively char-
acterize the difference of stereo structures between real faces and presentation
attacks. After incorporating with multi-scale texture features, the sensitivity
to stereo structures of presentation attacks is alleviated. As only a binocular
camera is needed, the PAD system with TFBD and SPMT descriptors is an
effective and cost-efficient alternative in real face recognition applications.
In future work, other advanced convolutional neural networks will be
investigated for face PAD algorithms. In addition, we also consider to incor-
porate TFBD and SPMT descriptors into deep networks for joint training, to
obtain the deep fused representations from unified model. It will be a future
direction to achieve a detection system for sophisticated counterfeits.
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